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LIABILITY OF DESIGN PROFESSIONALS FOR

PURELY ECONOMIC Loss
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

"The economic loss rule is stated with ease but applied with great difficulty."'
Such difficulties are patent in the construction context.2 The economic loss rule
"requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to
disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond a
broken contractual promise."3
A. IntroductoryHypothetical
GNL Contractors, Inc. was the low bidder on the construction of a new law
school for the University of South Carolina, and it subsequently contracted with the
University for this project.4 Acme Engineering, Inc. was the design engineer of the
law school project, and it contracted with the University for the design supervision
of the project. Acme and GNL were not in contractual privity.
Acme and GNL had numerous disagreements once construction began. Acme
made demands of GNL which were not in the contract between GNL and the
University. Furthermore, Acme delayed the job for over a month by falsely
accusing GNL of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
violations. Acme also mistakenly interpreted the contract between GNL and the
University, thus requiring GNL to spend more money to hire an expert to interpret
the contract. Ultimately, the University paid GNL the extra costs caused by the
school, but it refused to pay GNL for the extra costs caused by Acme. What
remedies does GNL have against Acme? Can GNL sue in contract or tort? Why
does it matter?

1. Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); see also Emily M. Usow, Redefining the ProfessionalService Contract: The Evolution and
DeconstructionofFlorida'sEconomicLoss Rule, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 1,1 (1999) (noting that the
economic loss doctrine "has caused a lot of confusion in courts throughout the United States").
2. Usow, supra note 1, at 20-21. According to Usow, "[t]he field of construction in particular
presents some unique and troublesome questions in the [economic loss rule] debate." Id. at 21.
3. R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowningin a Sea of Contract: Application ofthe Economic Loss
Rule to FraudandNegligentMisrepresentationClaims, 41 WM.& MARY L.PRv. 1789,1795-96 (2000)
(citing Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (111. 1982)). The economic loss rule is also
referred to as the "economic loss doctrine." See Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy
Waters ofEastRiver: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 260,260 (1997).
The terms are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
4. The facts of this hypothetical are based on Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Jordan,Jones & Goulding,Inc., 320 S.C. 49,463 S.E.2d 85 (1995).
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under Acme's contract with the University by disclaiming any liability to possible
third-party beneficiaries. Thus, "[g]enerally speaking, the tort remedy is likely to
be more advantageous to the injured party in the greater number of cases .... .
This is true because: (1) tort law will often permit the recovery of greater damages,
(2) the contract may further limit damages, (3)punitive damages are rarely allowed
in contract actions, and (4) a tort action may lie where a contract action fails for
want of consideration, illegality, the statute of frauds, uncertainty, the parol
evidence rule, or lack of proof.7
This Comment specifically addresses the liability of design professionals to
third parties with whom they are not in privity of contract. Design professionals
normally contract with the owner and not the general contractor.' The general
contractor will often seek to recover purely economic loss from the design
professional, thus forcing the court to decide whether or not to invoke the economic
loss doctrine.9 Traditionally, nearly every state, including South Carolina, has
invoked the economic loss rule to bar plaintiffs from recovering damages forpurely
economic loss from design professionals.'0 However, South Carolina has recently
joined the growing list" of states refusing to apply the economic loss rule to suits
against design professionals. 2
This Comment analyzes South Carolina's decision to extend liability for
economic loss to design professionals. Part II considers the traditional bars to
recovery in this context 3 and also discusses the origin 4 and expansion of the
economic loss doctrine.' 5 This discussion is based on the often conflicting, yet

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 665-66.
See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
See Griffin, 320 S.C. at 52, 463 S.E.2d at 87.
10. Id.
11. Id. at53 n. 1,463 S.E.2d at 87 n.1 (citing an extensive list ofcases); see also Milton F. Lunch,
"EconomicLoss Rule "Dealt Another Blow, BUILDINGDESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Aug. 1, 1992, at 23,
availableat 1992 WL 3119417 (noting that the "trend appears to be toward abandonment ofthe longstanding 'economic loss rule' and in favor of an approach that recognizes the realities of multiparty
involvement in construction projects").
12. Griffin, 320 S.C. at 55, 463 S.E.2d at 89.
13. The privity requirement and an early reluctance to award purely economic loss in tort are the
two traditional barriers to recovery and were major impetuses behind the development of the economic
loss doctrine. See Sidney R. Barrett,Jr.,Recovery ofEconomic Loss in Tortfor ConstructionDefects:

A CriticalAnalysis,40 S.C. L. REv. 891, 897-901 (1989).
14. The economic loss doctrine originated in the field ofproducts liability. See Usowsupranote
1, at 3 (citing Amanda K. Esquibel, The Economic Loss Rule andFiduciaryDuty Claims: Nothing
Stricter Than the Morals of the Marketplace?, 42 VILL. L. REv. 789, 791 (1997); Moransais v.
Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999)).

15. One scholar, addressing the rapid expansion ofthe Florida courts' use ofthe doctrine, termed
it "[tihe monster that ate commercial torts." Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The
Monster That Ate CommercialTorts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (1995).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss3/10

2

Bedenbaugh: Liability of Design Professionals for Purely Economic Loss in Sou
2002]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

equally meritorious, policy goals advanced by contract and tort law.1 6 Part I
analyzes the modem application of the economic loss doctrine generally, as well
as the application of the doctrine in South Carolina.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

The TraditionalBars to Recovery

A plaintiff seeking to recover purely economic loss from a design professional
in tort traditionally faced the following two obstacles: (1) the doctrine of privity
and (2) judicial reluctance.17 An extended discussion ofprivity is beyond the scope
of this Comment; however, it is worth mentioning because the privity concept in
tort is interwoven with the development of the economic loss doctrine."5 The privity
doctrine is linked to the economic loss doctrine in that both were applied by courts
to reach the same result-insulating defendants from liability to third parties."
Furthermore, the contractualprivity requirement traditionally forced many plaintiffs
to pursue tort remedies. 20
The traditional common-law privity requirement was recognized in South
Carolina in 1909.21 However, MacPhersonv. BuickMotor Co.,' a New York case,
began the abrogation of the privity requirement in products liability cases, and thus
in tort, involving personal injury.' South Carolina eventually followed suit in
Salladin v. Tellis.24 Privity remains relevant to the discussion of the economic loss
doctrine because some courts view recovery of economic loss as the logical

16. "The economic loss doctrine marks the fundamental boundary between contract law, which
is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of
reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others." Barrett,
supranote 13, at 894-95.
17. Barrett, supra note 13, at 898. Barrett also notes that judicial hostility to recovery of purely
economic loss in tort predates the twentieth-century products liability debate. Id. at 897.
18. Courts originally interpreted Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), to mean that
"a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor is not liable to third parties who have no contractual relations
with him for negligence in construction, manufacture, or sale of the articles he handles." Huset v. J.I.
Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1903). The concept ofprivity thus restricted
negligence actions to those that arose out of a contractual duty. See also Martha Crandall Coleman,
LiabilityofDesign ProfessionalsforNegligentDesignandProjectManagement,33 TORT&INs. L.J.
923, 931 (1998) (same).
19. See Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 80,374 S.E.2d
897, 901 (Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the "traditional common law reached the same result [as the
economic loss rule] by applying the doctrine ofprivity ofcontract"), overruledbyKennedyv. Columbia
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 345, 384 S.E.2d 730, 736 (1989).
20. See Barrett, supra note 13, at 898 (listing lack of privity as a reason plaintiffs sought to
recover in tort instead of contract).
21. See Ancrum v. Camden Water, Light & Ice Co., 82 S.C. 284,293, 64 S.E. 151, 154 (1909).
22. 111N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
23. Coleman, supranote 18, at 926.
24. 247 S.C. 267, 271, 146 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1966).
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extension ofMacPherson.' Ultimately, foreseeability and proximate cause replaced
the requirement of privity of contract.26 In sum, the abrogation of a strict privity
requirement was caused by factors similar to those responsible for the abrogation
of the economic loss doctrine.27
Prior to judicial construction of the economic loss doctrine, plaintiffs faced
opposition when attempting to recover pure economic loss.28 Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche 9 and Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co.3" are the two leading cases on point.
In Ultramares,the court refused to hold an accounting firm liable to a third party
who relied on a balance sheet that was negligently certified by the defendant.3 The
plaintiff loaned money to the party for whom the erroneous balance sheet was
prepared and suffered purely economic loss.32 In an opinion authored by Judge
Benjamin Cardozo, the New York Court of Appeals held that the accountants owed
no duty to the plaintiff because to rule otherwise would expose accountants to
liability to an indeterminate class for an indeterminate amount.33 The accountants'
liability for negligence was bounded by the contract which created their duty.34
In Stevenson, the plaintiff claimed damages in tort for purely economic loss due
to a fire caused by the defendant's negligence.35 The damages sought were the
amount of wages due to the plaintiff under an employment contract he was unable
to perform because of the fire.36 The court had no trouble in denying recovery
because of the potentially overwhelming mass of litigation that would ensue if it
were to hold otherwise.37
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint also illustrates the early judicial
reluctance to award economic loss in tort. The plaintiffs in Robins Dry Dock, who
had time-chartered a steamship from its owners, sustained economic loss because
of the defendant dock company's negligence.39 The U.S. Supreme Court held that
such loss was not recoverable because "a tort to the person or property of one man
does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person

25. Barrett, supranote 13, at 908 (citing Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morriss Assocs., 418
A.2d 1290, 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); State ex reL Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell,

442 P.2d 215, 218-19 (Or. 1968)).
26. See Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603, 617 (Ct. App. 1977).
27. See Barrett, supra note 13, at 908.
28. Id. at 898.
29. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
30. 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
31. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448.

32. Id. at443.
33. Id. at 448. But cf Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y. 1922) (holding defendant

liable in negligence for purely economic loss to third party with whom he was not in privity).
34. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448.
35. Stevenson, 73 N.E.2d at 201.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 203-04.
38. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
39. Id. at 307.
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was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong. The law
does not spread its protection so far."'
B. The Originof the Economic Loss Doctrine
Judicial reluctance to award economic loss ultimately manifested itself in the
economic loss rule." The doctrine originated in the products liability context.42
Seely v. White Motor Co.43 contains the first articulation of the economic loss
doctrine.' The defendant in Seely manufactured a truck that was used by the
plaintiff in his hauling business.4" The truck overturned, but the plaintiff was not
injured in the crash.' The plaintiff sought recovery in tort from the defendant for
lost profits and for damage to the truck.47
The court held that the defendant was not liable in tort for the lost profits.48 The
plaintiff's potential recovery was in warranty, not in strict liability or negligence.49
The rule of Seely prevented manufacturers frombeing exposedto indefinite liability
to unanticipated plaintiffs. 50 However, from the outset,5 1 courts were split on the
appropriateness of imposing liability for damage to the product and for
consequential loss, and that controversy is not yet resolved. 52

40. Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
41. Judge Cardozo's concern aboutpotentiallyboundless liability in tort forpurely economic loss,
originally expressed in Ultramares,continues to be "one of the mostpersuasive arguments in favor of
the modem economic loss rule." Barrett, supranote 13, at 900 (citing Leadfree Enters., Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 711 F.2d805, 808 (7thCir. 1983); MoormanMfg. Co. v.Nat'lTankCo.,435N.E.2d
443,447 (Ill. 1982)); Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124,128
(Iowa 1984); Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. v. Indian Head Cattle Co., 627 P.2d 469,473 (Or. 1981); Rodriquez
v. Carson, 519 S.W.2d 214,216 (Tex. App. 1975).
42. See supranote 14.
43. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
44. Barton, supra note 3, at 1794.
45. Seely, 403 P.2d at 147.
46. Id.
47. Id.at 147-48. The court termed these losses "commercial losses." Id. at 150. Judge Richard
Posner also asserts that it would be better to call such losses commercial. Millerv. UnitedStatesSteel
Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Posner reasons that the name "commercial loss
doctrine" is a more appropriate than economic loss doctrine because: (1) injuries to person orproperty
are economic as well, in that both destroy values capable of being monetized and (2) commercial
connotes Posner's belief that the law of contract is designed to resolve such disputes. Id.
48. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
49. Id.
50. See W. Dudley McCarter, The Economic Loss Doctrine in ConstructionLitigation, 18
CONSTRUCTION LAw. 21, 22 (July 1998).
51. The Seely court recognized the contrary position taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Santorv. A &MKaragheusian,Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1965). Seely, 403 P.2d at 151; see also
Barrett, supranote 13, at 912 (noting that Seely and Santorrepresent opposing views on the issue of
whether damage to the product itself represents compensable physical harm).
52. Many modem courts respond to the unlimited liability concern by limiting plaintiffs to an
identifiable class. See Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 360 (Alaska 1987).
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The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the economic loss rule in EastRiver
Steamship Corp. v. TransamericaDelaval, Inc.,53 an admiralty case. The Court
noted that it was "charting a course between products liability and contract law." 4
Ultimately, the Court "adopt[ed] an approach similar to Seely and [held] that a
manufacturer in a commercial relationship ha[d] no duty under either a negligence
or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself."5 The
East River Steamship rationale basically traced that of Seely. 6 The Court also
stressed that the tort-law concern with safety was not implicated when only the
product itself was injured. s7 In sum, the Court believed that contract law was better
suited to address injury to the product itself. 8
C. The DividingLine Between Contractand Tort
EastRiver Steamship stands for the proposition that contract law and tort law
are separate and that "the economic loss rule operate[s] to separate them."59 The
South Carolina Supreme Court recognized this point in the following explanation
of the economic loss doctrine:
This rule exists to assist in determining whether contract or tort
theories are applicable to a given case. Where a purchaser's
expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought
is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone,
for he has suffered only "economic" losses. Conversely, where a
purchaser buys a product which is defective and physically harms
him, his remedy is in either tort or contract. This is so, the
analysis provides, because his losses are more than merely
"economic." 60
This notion that the economic loss rule is the dividing line between the law of
contract and the law of tort is important to an understanding of the arguments for
and against the doctrine. The same line divides the opposing policy arguments."
Thus, arguments encouragingjudicial application of the economic loss doctrine are
framed in terms of contract law, while arguments favoring the abrogation of the
doctrine in a particular context look to the goals of tort law for justification. 2
53. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
54. Id. at 859.
55. Id. at 871. The Court specifically declined to reach the issue whether purely economic loss
could ever be recovered in tort in an admiralty case. Id. at 871 n.6.
56. Id. at 871.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 872.
59. Barrett, supra note 13, at 917.
60. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335,345,384 S.E.2d 730,736 (1989).
61. See Barton, supra note 3, at 1796 ("The distinction drawn by the economic loss rule reaches
to the heart of the differences between the underlying purposes of tort and contract law.").
62. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
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For example, proponents of the economic loss doctrine believe that it
"promote[s] efficiency andpredictability in commercial settings by limiting liability
to that contemplated in the contract."'63 The economic loss rule "prevent[s] the law
of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other."" The merit of
65
contract law vis-i-vis tort law is thus the foundation ofthe economic loss debate
6
Tort law serves to protect the societal interest in freedom from harm. Policy
considerations, rather than agreements between the parties, give rise to tort duties.'
A contractual duty, by contrast, "arises from society's interest in the performance
of promises."6 Therefore, tort law better serves unanticipated physical injury
claims.69 Contract law is more appropriate for redressing claims
for damages that
70
the parties have (or could have) dealt with in their agreement.

mU. ANALYSIS
A. The Modern Application of the EconomicLoss Doctrine
The modem application 7 ofthe economic loss doctrine may be bestunderstood
in terms of its exceptions. In a number ofjurisdictions, one such exception applies
to design professionals. 72 The ebb and flow of the exceptions over time represents
the courts' struggle with the doctrine.

63. Usow, supranote 1,at 10-11 (citing Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy
Waters ofEast River: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later,64 DEF. CoUNs. J. 260,261 (1997)).
But cf.Kelly M. Hnatt, Note, PurelyEconomicLoss: A StandardforRecovery, 73 IoWAL. REV. 1181,
1184 (1988) (noting that most courts which hold a negligent defendant liable for economic loss do so
with the perspective that a defendant should be liable for all foreseeable harm without regard to the
nature of the harm).
64. Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 969 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
65. See N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 326 (Alaska 1981)
(noting the split in authority from the time ofSeely andSantoris "primarily a result ofdifferent attitudes
as to what area of law should govern").
66. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 1985).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. As one commentator explains:
Themodern economic loss doctrine developed inresponse to three different
jurisprudential concerns: (1)the theoretical difficulties ofusingconduct-oriented
tort standards to protect expectancy interests createdby contract; (2) the practical
difficulty in fashioning a rule that permits recovery for economic loss without
subjecting the defendantto potentially limitless liability; and (3) conflietbetween
an expanded duty in tort and the manufacturer's rights under the Uniform
Commercial Code.
Barrett, supranote 13, at 897.
72. See generallyColeman, supranote 18, at 923-43 (addressing the economic loss doctrine as
it applies to negligence claims against design professionals).
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1. Intentional Torts
The economic loss doctrine does not apply to intentional torts.73 "In such cases,
the very object of the wrongful 7conduct
is to harm the plaintiff's economic
'4
interests, and recovery is allowed.
2. Injury to Person or OtherProperty
The economic loss rule traditionally did not apply in cases of injury to the
person or to property other than the product itself in either the negligence or strict
7
liability contextY.
Recovery for injury to the person or to other property is not
barred by the economic loss doctrine because these interests are generally protected
by tort law. 76 Essentially, when a defective product causes physical harm to an
individual or damages other property, "the resultant loss is not considered
'economic' and recovery for the damage is permitted in tort., 77 Damage to property
other than the product itself presumably invokes tort law's concern with safety.

3.

The Sudden-and-DangerousException

Courts have also carved out a "sudden-and-dangerous" exception to the
economic loss rule in the strict liability context. 7' The sudden-and-dangerous test
is an "intermediate position. '79 The test attempts to resolve the issue of whether
harm to the product itself is property damage compensable in tort or whether such
harm is economic loss for which tort recovery is barred by the economic loss
doctrine."0 The sudden-and-dangerous exception stands for the proposition that a

tort remedy is available for damage caused by an inherently dangerous product.8'

73. See Barrett, supranote 13, at 892 n.2 (citing Waldinger Corp. v. Ashbrook-Simon-Hartley,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 970, 981 (C.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part sub nom. Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group
Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F. 2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985); Santucci Constr. Co. v. Baxter & Woodman, Inc., 502
N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Il. 1986)); see also Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Tort Liability of Project
ArchitectforEconomicDamagesSufferedbyContractor,65 A.L.R.3d 249, 261-65 (1975) (noting that
an action would lie for purely economic damages for intentional torts).
74. Barrett, supra note 13, at 892 n.2.
75. Id. at 895.
76. Id. Barrett notes that the majority of courts have little difficulty distinguishing injury to
property other than the product and injury to the person from so-called economic loss. Id. at 895-96.
77. Id. at 895.
78. Id.at 914-19. The sudden-and-dangerous test or exception may also be termed the "inherentlydangerous-product exception." See generallyMeCarter, supranote 50, at 24-25 (noting that a number
of courts have recognized the inherently-dangerous-product exception where a toxic or hazardous
product damages other property and endangers life or health).
79. Barrett, supra note 13, at 915.
80. Id. at 915-16.
81. See N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1981)
(holding that "when a defective product creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other
property, and loss occurs as a result of that danger, strict liability in tort is an appropriate theory of
recovery, even though the damage is confined to the product itself') (footnote omitted).
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By distinguishing between inherently dangerous products-those that can cause
"sudden and calamitous" damage-and those that are not so dangerous, courts draw
the line between "products which simply do not live up to their economic
expectations and those which, although they did not break down in a manner which
proved hazardous to persons or to other property, could foreseeably have done
SO.5182

4. ProfessionalMalpractice
Some courts have also refused to apply the economic loss doctrine to
negligence claims in the context of professional malpractice.83 Professionals
excluded from using the economic loss doctrine as a defense include abstractors,
engineers, appraisers, and accountants.' The exception also applies to attorneys'
and is based on the attorney-client relationship and on the attorney's expertise. 6
Courts generally frame legal malpractice in terms of negligence, but a minority of
courts consider legal malpractice a breach of contract and limit recovery to
economic losses.8 7 One commentator concludes that courts are correct in refusing
to apply the economic loss doctrine to professional malpractice cases because "[t]o
the extent that most professionals must comply with the standards set forth for other
professionals in their community, these duties are extracontractual and therefore
cannot be barred by the economic loss rule."88 Furthermore, professional service
relationships are characterized by an information disparity between the parties.8 9
This disparity conflicts with the economic loss rule because the rule is "based upon
the presumption that parties to a contract have pre-negotiated liability in the event
of a breach."9 Ultimately, some "[c]ourts have found it just to impose liability on
defendants who, by virtue of special training or other unique preparation for their
work, knew (or had reason to know) that their conduct would negligently harm
plaintiffs."'"

82. Id. at 328.
83. See, e.g., Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983-84 (Fla. 1999) (holding that the
economic loss rule does not bar negligence claims against professionals even though the damages are
purely economic and the parties were in a contractual relationship).
84. Usow, supra note 1, at 14.
85. See Mitchell v. Holler, 311 S.C. 406, 409, 429 S.E.2d 793,795 (1993).
86. See Hnatt,supranote 63, at 1199.
87. Usow, supra note 1, at 15.
88. Id. at 27.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Hnatt, supranote 63, at 1199. The professional duty exceptionis closely related to the special
relationship exception. Id."Courts have rationalized [the special relationship] exception on the theory
that a duty of care existed because the plaintiffs were foreseeable and the defendants' negligence
proximately caused theinjuries." Id. at 1196-97; see also Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y.
1922) (holding public weigher liable in tort to buyer of beans).
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5. Construction Context
The above exceptions are relevant to the application of the economic loss
doctrine in the construction context. The exception to the economic loss rule
applicable to professionals has also been held to apply in construction cases. 92 One
commentator, discussing the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Moransaisv.
Heathman,93 articulates two problems with applying the exception in the
construction context: (1) the distinction between a "service contract" and a "sale
of goods" is blurred and (2) Florida's definition of a "profession" is too broad for
application in construction cases. 94
Additionally, the sudden-and-dangerous exception was applied in the
construction context in Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v.
Whiting-Turner ContractingCo."' The Whiting-Turner court considered whether
an architect was liable in tort for creating a serious fire hazard.96 The court ruled
that the architect was liable, even in the absence of privity, if the "risk [was] of
death or personal injury."97
The two leading cases in which courts refused to apply the economic loss
doctrine and thus held design professionals liable for economic loss in the absence
ofprivity are UnitedStates v. Rogers & Rogers98and A.R. Moyer,Inc. v. Graham.
The Rogers court held an architect liable to the general contractor and others with
whom the architect was not in privity for purely economic loss.' 0 The test
articulated by the Rogers court for determining whether a defendant will be held
liable for negligence to a third party with whom he is not in privity is as follows:
[The imposition of liability is] a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the
foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing
future harm.10 '

92. See Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 979 (Fla. 1999).
93. 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).

94. Usow, supra note 1, at 20-21.
95. 517 A.2d 336, 338 (Md. 1986).

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 338-45.
Id. at 345.
161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973); see Coleman, supra note 18, at 926.

100. Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 136.
101. Id. at 135 (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)).
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The architect's power is equivalent to a "power of economic life or death over
the contractor."'0 2 Such control, coupled with the architect's relationship with the
general contractor imposes a legal duty upon the architect.0 3 Recovery for a breach
of this duty is not limited by the economic loss doctrine. 4"
The Moyer court similarly held an architect could be liable in tort for purely
economic loss to a general contractor "who may foreseeably be injured or sustain[]
an economic loss proximately caused by the negligentperformance of a contractual
duty of an architect."'0 5 The progeny of Rogers and Moyer have generally justified
architects' liability for purely economic loss on the basis of the professional nature
of their work and on the foreseeability of harm. 6
6. Economic Loss in Florida
Although the Florida Supreme Court refused to apply the economic loss
doctrine to design professionals in Moyer, Florida's economic loss jurisprudence
evolved and eventually "threatened to extinguish many commercial tort causes of
action."'0 7 Florida's district courts increasingly began to apply the economic loss
doctrine to bar tort actions.' The economic loss rule alarmingly spread to bar
claims for conversion, civil theft, tortious interference, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, strict liability, product liability, negligent misrepresentation, and
fraud." 9 Therefore, the economic loss rule was prohibiting legitimate commercial
tort claims."
The Florida Supreme Court responded to this concern in Moransais v.
Heathman."' The court "agree[d] with the observations of those who ha[d] noted
that because actions against professionals often involve[d] purely economic loss
without any accompanying personal injury or property damage, extending the
economic loss rule to these cases would effectively extinguish such causes of
action.""' Thus, the court in Moransaisheld that the economic loss rule does not
bar negligence actions against professionals, even if the professionals' torts result
in no personal injury or property damage.'
102. Id. at 136.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397,402 (Fla. 1973).
106. See, e.g., Hubert, Hunt &Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603, 617 (Ct. App. 1977);
Nat'l Sand, Inc. v.Nagel Constr., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 618,620 (Mich. Ct App. 1990);see also Coleman,
supra note 18, at 927. Additionally, other courts have based their decisions on negligent
misrepresentation while still others have allowed recovery in tort with no theoretical basis. See
Coleman, supra note 18, at 927.
107. Usow, supranote 1, at 1; see supranote 15.
108. Usow, supra note 1, at 6-7.
109. Id. All of the listed causes of action are "commercial torts designed to redress primarily
economic losses." Id. at 7.
110. Id.
111. 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
112. Id. at 983.
113. Id. at 983-84.
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Florida's struggle with the economic loss rule exhibits, among other things, the
validity of retaining exceptions to the rule. The economic loss doctrine should not
be construed to bar tort claims that have traditionally protected economic
interests." 4 Purely economic loss has always been recoverable under a variety of
tort theories." 5 However, there remains some debate over the scope of the
exceptions. 16
'
B. South CarolinaLaw
The South Carolina Court of Appeals' initial stance on the economic loss
doctrine, discussed in Carolina Winds Owners' Ass 'n v. Joe Harden Builder,
Inc.," 7 leaned heavily toward the contract side of the argument. The plaintiff
homeowners' association sought recovery from its general contractor for damage
to the exterior brick walls."' The homeowners' association was not in contractual
privity with the general contractor." 9 The court held that the brick damage was
purely economic loss and that recovery was therefore barred by the economic loss
doctrine. 2 The plaintiffs damages were described as the "benefit of [the]
bargain.'' As the court stated, "[u]nlike the law of contract, the law ofnegligence
does not protect the expectancy interest in the performance of a promise."'" Such
loss "can be fairly allocated by agreement."'" The court also emphasized the
importance of avoiding unrestricted liability to remote parties.' 24
The South Carolina Supreme Court moved the state across the dividing line
between tort and contract in Kennedy v. ColumbiaLumber & ManufacturingCo."
In Kennedy, the court overruled CarolinaWinds and held that a plaintiffhas a cause
of action in negligence, whether or not he is in privity of contract with a builder,
"where a builder has violated a legal duty, no matter the type of resulting

114. See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C.
49,54,463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1995) (noting that South Carolina law "has long recognized tort actions when
the damages are purely economic") (citing Mitchell v. Holler, 311 S.C. 406, 409, 429 S.E.2d 793, 795
(1993) (legal malpractice); Beachwalk Villas Condo. Ass'n v. Martin, 305 S.C. 144, 147,406 S.E.2d

372, 374 (1991) (architect liability)).
115. Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing, 320 S.C. at 54, 463 S.E.2d at 88.
116. See Usow, supra note 1, at 10-13 (delineating the arguments for and against reducing the
scope of the economic loss rule).
117. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988).

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 77,
Id. at 80,
Id. at 89,
Id. at 78,

374 S.E.2d at 899.
374 S.E.2d at 901.
374 S.E.2d at 906.
374 S.E.2d at 900.

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 82, 374 S.E.2d at 902.
Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 83, 374 S.E.2d at 902.
Id. at 83, 374 S.E.2d at 902-03.
299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
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27
damage."' 26 The decision was based primarily on public policy grounds
Specifically, South Carolina's policy ofprotectingnew home buyers influenced the
court's analysis."rs In the court's words, "[t]he practical difficulties facing today's
new home buyer mandate that we allow a buyer to ordinarily proceed against both
the builder and seller, or either of them."'"9 The court also reached its decision
based on its criticism of the economic loss doctrine. 3 The rule adopted by the
court purported to focus on actions, not consequences.13 ' Therefore, "a cause of
action in negligence will be available where a builder has violated a legal duty, no
matter the type of resulting damage."'3 2
Beachwalk Villas Condominium Ass'n v. Martin 33 extended the holding of
Kennedy to architects. InBeachwalk Villas,the plaintiffs sought to recover from the
defendant architect in negligence for the cost ofrepairing structural deficiencies.'
The court concluded that architects could be found liable to homeowners for
negligence even absent contractual privity between the parties. 3 ' Otherthan stating
that the decision was consistent with Kennedy, the court offered no explanation for
its holding.'36 Thus, after Beachwalk Villas, it was not clear exactly why South
Carolina imposed liability upon architects for purely economic loss.
The South Carolina Supreme Court resolved this ambiguity in Tommy L.
GriffinPlumbing& HeatingCo. v. Jordan,Jones & Goulding,Inc. 3 In Griffin, the
plaintiff contractor sought to recover purely economic loss from the engineer of a
water trunk construction project.33 The court offered three rationales for exposing
architects and design professionals to liability for economic loss. First, the reality
ofmodern tort law is that purely economic loss may be recoverable under a variety
of tort theories.'39 The dividing line between tort and contract is precisely defined
by a "determination of the source of the duty [the] plaintiff claims the defendant

126. Id.at 347,384 S.E.2d at 737. The court also concluded that the economic loss doctrinewould
still apply where duties were created solely by contract. Id.
127. Id. at 346, 384 S.E.2d at 737. The court admitted that "the Court of Appeals' reasoning in
CarolinaWinds appear[ed] to be a seamless web ofproperlegal analysis." Id. at341,384 S.E.2d at734.
128. Id. The court also noted South Carolina's tendency to embrace the maxim caveatvenditor
(let the seller beware) and to reject caveat emptor (let the buyerbeware). Id. at 343, 384 S.E.2d at 735.
129. Id. at 344, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
130. Id. at 345-46, 384 S.E.2d at 736-37. The court criticized the doctrine for focusing on
consequences, not action. Id. at 345,384 S.E.2d at 737. The court described the following anomaly:
"Builder 'A' and Builder 'B' can be equally blameworthy, and build equally shoddy housing, but
because Builder 'A's' negligence happened to be discovered early enough, no one was harmed. It
hardly seems fair that Builder 'A' should profit from a diligent buyer's discovery, or because he was
fortunate." Id.
131. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 345, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
132. Id. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
133. 305 S.C. 144, 406 S.E.2d 372 (1991).

134. Id. at 145,406 S.E.2d at 373.
135. Id. at 147, 406 S.E.2d at 374.
136. Id.
137. 320 S.C. 49,463 S.E.2d 85 (1995).

138. Id. at 51-52, 463 S.E.2d at 86-87.
139. Id. at 54, 463 S.E.2d at 88.
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owed."'" The court described this determination as follows: "A breach of a duty
which arises under the provisions of a contract between the parties must be
redressed under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of a duty arising
independently of any contract duties between the parties, however, may support a
tort action..'' 4
Second, the court noted that a "special relationship" between the parties will
support a tort action even though the parties are in privity of contract. 4 2 The special
relationship creates a duty of care outside the terms of the contract. 3
Third, the court emphasized the professional nature of architectural work.'
The court stated that it saw "no logical reason to insulate design professionals from
liability when the relationship between the design professional and the plaintiff
[was] such that the design professional owe[d] a professional duty to the plaintiff
arising separate and distinct from any contractual duties between the parties or with
third parties."'45 Liability ultimately depends on the facts and circumstances ofeach
46
case.1
IV. CONCLUSION

The proponents of a bright-line application of the economic loss rule would say
that Griffin blurs the line between tort and contract. However, in reality, the line
between tort law and contract law has always been blurred. 47 The dividing line will
continue to be unclear so long as (1) a number of tort claims protect commercial or
economic interests 148 and (2) the relationships are such that one party can
potentially harm another economically, thus forcing the judiciary to protect that
party in tort as a matter of public policy 49 Characterizing the damages as the
"benefit of the bargain" is not dispositive because defendants may tortiously
interfere with the benefit of the bargain. 5 ' The Grifin rationale adequately
maintains the distinction between tort and contract by focusing on the source of the
duty.' This distinction should continue to be observed so that the economic loss
"monster" does not consume commercial torts in South Carolina. 52 However, it is
simplistic to think that the economic loss doctrine is a talismanic device, capable
of always correctly categorizing claims as tort or contract. The doctrine is merely
relevant as a guidepost, particularly in the strict liability context.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 54-55, 463 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 55, 463 S.E.2d at 88.
Griffin, 320 S.C. at 55, 463 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 55, 463 S.E.2d at 89.
Id.
Id. at 55-56, 463 S.E.2d at 89.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 15, 107-16 and accompanying text.
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Proponents of a bright-line application of the economic loss doctrine would
further argue that the Griffin holding ignores the parties' sophistication and their
ability to intelligently allocate risk."' However, this view ignores the practice of
using standard-form contracts and the realities of the construction field where
"contracts do exist, but often get lost in the hierarchy of contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, architects and engineers." ' 4
5 5 and Seely .6 with regard to potentially limitless
The concerns of Ultramares'
liability are legitimate. However, Griffin's focus on foreseeability and special
relationships adequately addresses this issue to the extent that potential plaintiffs
are an identifiable class." 7
In sum, a bright-line economic loss defense is not available to architects in
South Carolina because the courts have made a conscientious policy decision to
protect home buyers and third parties who are at the economic mercy of the
architect." 8 In so doing, South Carolina may have better preserved the distinction
between contract and tort than would a bright-line rule by focusing on the source
of duty rather than on an antiquated characterization of damages. The source-ofduty test may seem circular in that the contract is, in a sense, the source of the duty
because it creates the relationships which give rise to a duty in tort. However, it
should be recognized that the true sources of the duty are the inherent authority
given to the design professional and South Carolina's public policy concern with
adequate protection from abuses of such authority.
Jody Bedenbaugh

153. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 13, at 932-33 (arguing that the economic loss doctrine is a
barrier to recovery for only two classes of owners: (1)those who fail to contract effectively and (2)
those who contract with an insolvent seller).
154. Usow, supra note 1, at 21.
155. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
156. See supranotes 43-52 and accompanying text.
157. See supranotes 142-46 and accompanying text.
158. See supranotes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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